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# The Missing Connections in Europe's Innovation Economy
- URL: https://hoeijmakers.net/the-missing-connections-in-europes-innovation-economy/
- Published: 2026-11-21T08:51:35.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-21T08:51:35.000Z
- Description: Europe has the knowledge, people, capital and institutions to innovate. What may be missing are the connections that turn those strengths into lasting economic capability.
- Author: Rob Hoeijmakers
- Tags: Europe, Innovation

I watched a [video by Andreas Klinger](https://youtu.be/x1%5F4b%5FYKW%5Fw) this week that brought together several things I had been thinking about separately.

Klinger is one of the people behind EU Inc., the initiative to create a common European corporate framework for start-ups. His frustration is that Europe produces plenty of ambitious founders, but makes it unnecessarily difficult for them to build companies across the continent. We create entrepreneurs, but we don't necessarily keep them.

I had been following EU Inc. for some time, but his argument made me think about a much larger question.

Over the past months, I have written about the distinction between R&D and innovation, European capital markets, labour-market flexibility, education, industrial policy and public procurement. They seemed like different subjects, each with its own problems and possible solutions.

Increasingly, I am beginning to see them as parts of the same problem.

Europe's difficulty may not be a lack of innovation itself. It may be the connections that allow knowledge to become a company, a company to become a successful business, and that success to create the conditions for the next generation.

## Europe can invent. What happens afterwards?

A new [OECD analysis of European and American start-ups](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/what-it-takes-for-start-ups-to-scale-up%5F1f743fa7-en.html) helped me understand this distinction.

The researchers examined around 190,000 innovative start-ups founded in the EU and the United States between 2000 and 2025\. Among the companies that patent, European start-ups show invention intensity comparable with their American counterparts. The more substantial differences appear when companies try to turn those inventions into commercial scale.

In the OECD dataset, around 3 per cent of innovative EU start-ups became what the researchers call growth-oriented firms, compared with 7 per cent in the United States. For companies reaching billion-dollar valuations, the figures were 0.6 and 1.2 per cent respectively.

Those differences matter because a relatively small number of exceptionally successful companies account for much of the investment attracted by start-ups. They can also generate experienced entrepreneurs, managers, investors and new businesses around them.

Europe's problem, in other words, is not simply that we struggle to produce promising ideas or businesses. We appear to have greater difficulty turning the most promising of them into large, successful companies.

And that brings me back to EU Inc.

## A company does not experience Europe as one market

In October, I wrote [EU Inc.: A Lesson in How Europe Makes Its Laws](https://hoeijmakers.net/eu-inc-how-europe-makes-its-laws/), partly because the initiative offered such an interesting view of European lawmaking.

The ambition is straightforward. A founder should be able to establish a company under a familiar European legal framework, with more consistent arrangements for investment, employee stock options and cross-border operations.

Today, companies still encounter different national rules for company formation, taxation, employment and administration. Europe has a Single Market, but building a company across that market is not always a single-market experience.

On 23 October, the Council [adopted its negotiating position](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/10/23/eu-inc-council-adopts-position-on-a-new-eu-corporate-law-for-innovative-companies/) on EU Inc. The proposal still has to pass through the remaining legislative process, with the European Parliament developing its own position. Klinger worries that the original ambition may be weakened along the way.

Whatever the eventual outcome, I find EU Inc. interesting for another reason.

Even a perfectly designed European corporate framework would not suddenly produce European technology giants.

A company can have an elegant legal structure and still struggle to find the capital required for expansion. It can attract capital but lack experienced managers. It can have both and encounter fragmented markets or customers unwilling to take a chance on an unfamiliar supplier.

And when an expensive technological experiment fails, the company must be able to change direction without destroying itself in the process.

These are not independent difficulties. They influence one another.

## Capital follows opportunity, and helps create it

I had already been exploring this relationship in [From lab to fab needs more than a fund](https://hoeijmakers.net/from-lab-to-fab-needs-more-than-a-fund/).

My argument there was that capital is not merely a quantity. Different stages of technological development require different kinds of investors, financing instruments, expertise and appetites for risk.

The OECD findings reinforce that view.

The transatlantic funding gap is relatively modest at the earliest stages. It becomes substantially larger when promising companies need exceptionally large investments to expand.

American start-ups also benefit from a much deeper domestic investment ecosystem. Around 80 per cent of the funding received by US start-ups comes from domestic investors. For EU start-ups, the comparable figure is around 45 per cent even when investment between EU member states is counted as domestic.

It is tempting to conclude that Europe simply needs to mobilise more of its enormous stock of savings for European businesses.

But that leaves something important unexplained.

Why should European savings become European risk capital?

Investors normally seek attractive returns for the risks they take. If an American company offers better prospects, there is no obvious economic reason to invest in a European company instead, unless other strategic considerations come into play.

So the question is not only how we get more money into European companies. It is also how we make European companies better investment opportunities.

And suddenly the rest of the economy becomes relevant.

Fragmented markets make expansion harder. Limited routes to very large scale affect expected returns. Expensive failures increase the risks of experimentation. Thin exit markets make it more difficult for investors to realise their gains and recycle capital into new ventures.

The shortage of scale-up capital may therefore be both a cause **and a consequence** of Europe's scaling problem.

Fewer large successes mean fewer attractive exits, fewer experienced investors and fewer managers who have built large companies before. That can make the next generation of companies harder to finance and develop.

But the opposite process is also possible. Successful companies attract capital, develop talent, create opportunities for suppliers and produce entrepreneurs who go on to start something new.

This is what makes the OECD's description of scaling as a cumulative process so interesting. Success can reinforce the conditions that make further success possible.

It is a feedback loop.

## Change has a cost

Another connection emerged from work I have been following around FESDI and research by Oliver Coste and Yann Coatanlem into the cost of corporate restructuring.

Their argument starts from the economics of disruptive innovation.

Technological experimentation involves a high probability of failure. Companies invest in approaches that may never work, and investors rely on a relatively small number of successes to compensate for unsuccessful bets.

But abandoning an unsuccessful activity also costs money.

Coste and Coatanlem argue that employee-related restructuring costs are substantially higher in several large Western European economies than in the United States. In their analysis, these differences can make high-risk technological investments less attractive.

Their proposed response includes targeted forms of flexicurity rather than simply removing worker protections.

The evidence is contested. [More recent research from Bocconi](https://iep.unibocconi.eu/publications/working-papers/working-paper-restructuring-costs-and-innovation), using a different methodology, found much smaller differences in dismissal costs and questioned whether restructuring costs are really among the main obstacles to innovation. Coste has challenged that interpretation in turn.

I find the disagreement useful because it exposes a broader issue, even if the relative importance of restructuring costs remains uncertain.

An innovative economy needs the capacity to reallocate resources.

Companies must be able to stop doing things that no longer work. Capital needs to move towards more promising opportunities. People need to move between activities, companies and sometimes entire industries.

That does not necessarily mean making workers less secure.

The Netherlands provides an interesting example. In its [productivity review published on 12 November 2026](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/productivity-review-of-the-netherlands%5F1628d921-en.html), the OECD examines the country's slowing productivity growth and declining business dynamism. It considers firm entry, exit and growth, alongside the movement of workers and other resources between companies.

Its recommendations touch labour legislation, education, insolvency, start-up administration, R&D and venture capital.

Again, the subjects we normally discuss separately turn out to be connected.

And there is an important distinction underneath them.

An economy can make restructuring easier by allowing companies to dismiss workers with fewer obligations, leaving individuals to absorb much of the risk. But flexibility can also be combined with income protection, retraining and support for finding new employment.

Denmark's approach to flexicurity is interesting precisely because it attempts to combine flexibility for employers with security for individuals.

The objective need not be to preserve every existing job, activity or company. It can be to make economic change survivable for the people involved.

Perhaps a dynamic economy should try to protect **people through change**, rather than protect every existing economic structure **against change**.

I think that distinction is especially important when we talk about Europe's technological future.

## Adaptability starts with education

This brought me back to another subject I had been exploring.

In [Education in an Age of Abundant Intelligence](https://hoeijmakers.net/education-in-an-age-of-abundant-intelligence/), I started with artificial intelligence and personalised learning, but eventually returned to Wilhelm von Humboldt and the idea of *Bildung*.

Education is an obvious part of any discussion about technological development. Quantum computing needs physicists, engineers and technicians. Semiconductor manufacturing requires highly specialised capabilities. AI creates demand for people who understand its development, application and consequences.

We need those skills, but trying to predict the precise workforce requirements of future industries can only take us so far.

We do not know exactly which technologies will succeed, which occupations AI will transform most profoundly or which industries Europe will eventually build. Today's schoolchildren will work in an economy we cannot accurately describe.

That is not an entirely new condition. Every generation has faced an uncertain future.

What interests me about *Bildung* is that education is not understood merely as preparation for a particular occupation. It also develops judgement, intellectual independence and the capacity to encounter unfamiliar things and learn from them.

Those qualities matter in an economy where people may need to move between occupations and industries.

But education alone cannot create adaptability.

A person may possess the ability to learn something new and still lack the financial security, time or opportunities needed to make a transition. A worker trapped in a declining activity does not become more mobile simply because we tell them that lifelong learning is important.

So the connection runs in both directions.

Education helps people navigate change. Labour-market institutions determine how feasible that change is. The availability of new companies and growing industries determines whether there are worthwhile opportunities to move towards.

And successful industries can, in turn, create demand for new education and training.

An adaptable economy requires adaptable people, but adaptability is not simply an individual responsibility. It is also something the surrounding institutions must make possible.

## Innovation needs customers

There is another important part of this picture that I have been trying to understand: demand.

Earlier this year, I wrote [Europe can invent. But can it buy what it invents?](https://hoeijmakers.net/europe-can-invent-but-can-it-buy-what-it-invents/)

We often discuss innovation policy in terms of research funding, start-up support and venture capital. Yet a company ultimately needs customers, not just investors.

And an early customer can do considerably more than provide revenue.

A demanding customer gives a new company an opportunity to prove that its technology works outside the laboratory. It creates experience, references and credibility. Those things can make the company more attractive to other customers and investors.

This is particularly interesting in sectors where governments and public institutions are major buyers.

Defence, healthcare, energy and infrastructure all involve substantial public spending and demanding technical requirements. Public procurement can help determine which technologies are developed, tested and eventually deployed at scale.

The relationship between customer and supplier can become another feedback loop. A new company gains experience by solving a difficult problem. The customer gains a new capability. The supplier becomes better equipped to serve other customers, and potentially to enter international markets.

That does not mean public procurement should become a mechanism for permanently favouring European companies regardless of performance. Protecting established suppliers against competition could weaken the very dynamism we want to encourage.

But it does suggest that innovation policy cannot stop at financing research and supporting start-ups. The conditions under which new businesses obtain their first serious customers deserve just as much attention.

A company that cannot find a market will not scale, however impressive its technology.

## What should remain in Europe?

At this point, the different strands of my thinking begin to come together.

Education produces knowledge and capabilities. Research can generate new technologies. Entrepreneurs turn some of those technologies into businesses. Investors provide capital. Workers and managers develop the organisations. Customers create demand.

Some experiments fail, and resources need to move elsewhere. Some companies succeed, creating expertise, wealth and opportunities for others.

But these relationships do not form a simple production line. They operate in several directions, with successes and failures affecting what happens next.

This is hardly a new economic insight. Researchers have studied [innovation systems](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/broadening-innovation-policy-for-regions-and-cities%5F299731d2-en/full-report/component-6.html) for decades, examining the relationships between companies, institutions, knowledge and markets.

What is becoming clearer to me is how relevant that perspective is to Europe's particular circumstances.

A country or continent can perform extremely well in one part of the system while capturing relatively little of the value created elsewhere.

Universities can produce knowledge that is commercialised abroad. European investors can finance promising young companies whose subsequent growth is financed from the United States. Skilled people can find better opportunities elsewhere. Public institutions can finance research and later purchase the resulting technologies from suppliers based outside Europe.

None of those outcomes is necessarily a failure in isolation. Knowledge, people, companies and capital should be able to cross borders.

But if the most successful parts of an innovation system repeatedly develop their capabilities elsewhere, the local ecosystem may lose opportunities to strengthen itself.

This makes technological sovereignty a more interesting concept than simply keeping companies under European ownership.

A company might have European shareholders but employ most of its researchers and engineers elsewhere. Another might be internationally owned while maintaining important research facilities, suppliers, skilled employment and production capabilities in Europe.

Ownership matters in some circumstances, particularly where strategic control is important. But so do the people, institutions, infrastructure and experience that make future technological development possible.

Perhaps the more useful question is how much capability an economy develops and retains, and whether that capability helps generate the next generation of businesses and technologies.

## A European approach to dynamism

There is an obvious complication in all of this.

The United States becomes the natural point of comparison whenever we discuss venture capital, technology companies, labour-market flexibility or business dynamism. And for good reason. It has been remarkably successful at developing companies that achieve enormous global scale.

But using the United States as a reference does not mean Europe should copy its entire economic and social model.

European societies have made different choices about education, worker protection, healthcare, market regulation and the responsibilities of public institutions. Those choices reflect political and social priorities, not merely economic inefficiencies waiting to be removed.

The challenge is to understand which arrangements genuinely obstruct economic adaptation and which might help make it possible.

Can companies experiment and change direction without transferring unreasonable risks to their employees? Can people move between industries while retaining enough security to make those transitions feasible? Can European capital markets offer attractive returns without depending on investors accepting weaker opportunities out of patriotism?

And can public institutions support the development of new technologies without simply protecting established companies from competition?

These questions do not have to lead to an American answer.

Indeed, the relationship between security and adaptability may be one of the most interesting opportunities for a European approach. People who have strong educational foundations and meaningful protection against the consequences of failure may be better equipped to take risks, change jobs or start businesses themselves.

Whether our institutions actually achieve that combination is another matter. It is something to investigate, rather than assume.

## The connections matter

I started this week watching Andreas Klinger talk about EU Inc. and the difficulties of building European companies.

What stayed with me was not only his frustration with company law, but how closely it connected to other questions I had been exploring.

Capital markets depend on the opportunities companies can create. Those opportunities depend on access to customers, talent and markets. The willingness to experiment depends partly on what happens when experiments fail. People's ability to move towards new opportunities depends on education, security and the existence of growing businesses.

And success in one part of the economy can make the others stronger.

I no longer find it particularly convincing to treat each of these as a separate European innovation problem, each waiting for its own policy intervention.

That doesn't mean every difficulty has the same cause, or that improving one connection will automatically improve the others. Some reforms may reinforce one another; others will involve genuine political and economic trade-offs.

But it changes where I want to look.

Europe already possesses an extraordinary stock of knowledge, skills, capital and institutional capability. The question is how effectively those resources can move, combine, adapt and produce new capabilities that strengthen the economy over time.

I don't yet have a programme to offer.

But I think I am beginning to see why the connections matter as much as the individual parts.

And that seems a more useful starting point for thinking about Europe's technological future than simply asking for more innovation.